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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Respondent, Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal"), filed suit against the

Appellants, H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen ("Van Engelens"), upon their personal guaranty of
six land/development and construction loans to Van Engelen Development, Inc. ("VED"). The
District Court entered summary judgment against the Van Engelens in the sum of $5,036,998.86
(inclusive of attorneys fees and costs awarded), representing the combined deficiency balances due
upon the loans following disposition of the real property collateral pursuant to statutory non-judicial
deed of trust foreclosure sales. (R. Vol. III, p. 00519-00520).
After ultimately admitting they did in fact sign the subject continuing guaranty agreement,
the Van Engelens asserted various affirmative defenses which they contend should have precluded
the entry of summary judgment by the District Court. The District Court found most of the
affirmative defenses asserted by the Van Engelens were fatally defective because, even ifthe alleged
misrepresentations by bank representatives were true, they were made (1) approximately one year
prior to the closing ofthe subiect loans at issue herein; and (2) were made in the context ofloans to
a separate and distinct legal entity borrowing money from Washington Federal. Equally fatal was
the absence of any contractual or legal duty for Washington Federal to disclose the existence of the
Guaranty to the Van Engelens. The District Court's decision separately addresses each of the Van
Engelens' affirmative defenses, and the basis' upon which summary judgment was granted on each
such defense. (Tr. p. 67 L. 10 - p. 77 L. 24.)
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B.

Brief Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings

1.

Facts not in dispute.

The Van Engelens are a married couple with approximately 37 years of combined experience
in real estate development. (R. Vol. II, p. 00366, at p. 5 L. 7-10; R. Vol. II, p. 00385, at p. 5 L. 2224.) The Van Engelens are the principals ofVEO. (R. Vol. I, p. 00096, at ~ 2; R. Vol. I, p. 00086,
at

f

2.) The Van Engelens are also the principals of Northwest Development Company, Inc.

("NWD"). lei In2002, Washington Federal extended credit to VEO in the amount of$126,000.00
("2002 Loan"). (R. Vol. I, p. 00096, at

~

3; R. Vol. I, p. 00086, at

~

3.) On August 14,2002, the

Defendants signed a personal continuing guaranty on behalfofVED. (R. Vol. I, p. 00056-00057;
R. Vol. II, p. 369 at p. 18 L. 20, p. 19 L. 25; R. Vol. II, p. 386 at p. 9, L. 16-23.) The Continuing
General Guaranty Agreement ("Guaranty"), personally guaranteed "paymentto Lender [Washington
Federal] of all Obligations that Borrower [VEO] owes to Lender now or in the future." (R. Vol. I,
p. 00056-00057.) The Guaranty also reads in pertinent parts, as follows:
Written Notice Needed to Withdraw Guarantor's Promise. Guarantor's Promise
shall be a continuing guaranty as to any present or future Obligations Borrower owes
Lender and shall remain effective until Lender actually receives written notice from
Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise.
Guarantor's Additional Waivers of Notice. Lender does not have to notify
Guarantor of any of the following events and this will not affect Guarantors Promise.
(a) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor of Lender's acceptance of Guarantor's
Promise.
(b) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor when lender lends money or extends
other credit to Borrower or acquires Obligations of Borrower. lei
The 2002 Loan was paid in full by VED. (R. Vol. I, p. 00086-00087, at ~ 5; R. Vol. I, p.
00096, at ~ 5.) In February 2005, Washington Federal extended credit to NWO, ("2005 Loans"), the
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proceeds of which were used by NWD to acquire Phases III and IV of the Carriage Hill Subdivision
project.

(R. Vol.III, p. 00418-00440.)

The Van Engelens allege that during the course of

negotiations and closing of the 2005 Loans to NWD, Washington Federal employees orally
represented that personal guarantees would not be required.
R. Vol. I, p. 00097- 00098 at

~~

CR. Vol. I, p. 00087- 00088 at ~~ 10-20;

10-21; R. Vol. III, p. 00452 at,; 8.)

In a series of six real estate development loans totaling $6,225,860.97, the loans at issue in
this lawsuit, Washington Federal extended credit to VED, with the first of these loans closing on
January 18,2006 and the last closing on March 28,2007 ("2006-2007 Loans"). (R. Vol. I, p. 00045
-00058 at ~~ 3 -6, Exhibits 1-6 attached thereto.) There is no dispute that VED ultimately defaulted
on the 2006-2007 Loans. (R. Vol. I, p. 00046, at

,r 6.)

Following foreclosure of the collateral

securing the 2006-2007 Loans, and after applying all credits and debits, a balance of$4,452,809.67
remained due and owing. (R. Vol. I, p. 00047-00048 at ~~ 7-10, Exhibit 7 attached thereto.) No
dispute exists that the Van Engelens have not paid any part of the deficiency amounts. (R. Vol. I, p.
00048-00049 at ~ 12.)
There is also no dispute that the Van Engelens never delivered written notice of the
withdrawal of their respective guarantees for loans or credit extended to VED. CR. Vol. II, p. 369,
p. 20, L. 1 - 15; R. Vol. II, p. 391, p. 32, L. 8-14.) Further, there is no dispute that neither
vVashington Federal or the Van Engelens signed any other vvTiting that would otherwise modify the
subject continuing Guaranty for the 2006-2007 Loans. There is no evidence, testimony, and/or
allegation proffered by the Van Engelens on the record below that Washington Federal made
misrepresentations regarding the requirement of personal guaranties with respect to the 2006-2007
Loans to VED.
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2.

The Lawsuit.

On September 9, 2009, Washington Federal filed suit against the Van Engelens in their
capacity as guarantors of the 2006-2007 Loans to VED. (R. Vol. I, p. 00008-00012.) On October
2, 2009, the Van Engelens filed a pro se answer wherein they asserted more than twenty-five
affirmative defenses. (R. Vol. I, p. 00013-00018.) On April 6, 2010, Washington Federal filed its
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 00019-00058.)
Legal counsel for the Van Engelens filed a notice of appearance on or about Apri116, 2010.
The Van Engelens then filed their opposition to Washington Federal's summary judgment motion
on May 13,2010, along with an alternate motion to continue summary judgment for the purpose of
permitting more time to analyze the legal and factual issues of the case and to conduct
discovery/depositions. (R. Vol. I, p. 00065-00099.) On August 13,2010, pursuant to the Van
Engelens' Motion and the District Court's Order, the Van Engelens filed their Amended Answer and
Demand for Jury Trial which asserted fifteen affirmative defenses. (R. Vol. I, p. 00110-00114.)
Washington Federal's summary judgment Motion was continued, and the parties re-briefed
the summary judgment motion, (along with supplemental affidavits and various motions), and
provided supplemental briefing at the District Court's invitation addressing the applicability of the
statute of frauds. (R. Vol. I, p. 00117-00200; R. Vol. II, p. 00201-00397; R. Vol. III, p. 0039800506.) Ihe summary judgment hearing was ultimately heard on November 12,2010. (Ir. P. 1078.) Ruling from the bench, the District Court granted summary judgment to Washington Federal
on its claims, as well as to all the affirmative defenses asserted by the Van Engelens. (Ir. p. 77,1..
19-24.)
On December 14, 2010, the District Court entered a Judgment in favor of Washington
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Federal against the Van Engelens in the sum of $4,996, 10 1.65 (inclusive of pre-judgment interest).
(R. Vol. III, p. 00511-00512.) On January 25, 2011, the Van Englens filed a timely Notice of Appeal
as to "Whether the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff,
conferring a judgment against the Van Engelens." (R. Vol. III, p. 00513-00518.) In response to
Washington Federal's application for fees and costs, the District Court entered an Amended
Judgment against the Van Engelens in the sum of$5,036,998.86. (R. Vol. III, p. 00519-00520.)
C.

Standard of Review
The Supreme Court employs the same standard of review as the district court when ruling

on motions for summary judgment. Zingiber Inc., LLC v. Hagerman Highway Dist., 150 Idaho 675,
680,249 P.3d 868,873 (2011). Moreover, when the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material
fact, then only questions of law remain, for which the Supreme Court exercises free review. ld.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, af1idavits, and discovery documents on file with
the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of
fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Thomson v. City of

Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476,50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002).
Summary judgment cannot be granted for Washington Federal if there are remaining
affirmative defenses that have not been put at issue on that motion for summary judgment. Sirius

LLC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 43,156 P.3d 539, 544 (2007). However, the Van Engelens bear the
burden of proof as to each of the affirmative defenses asserted on appeal. Chandler v. Hayden, 147
Idaho 765, 769-71,2] 5 P.3d 485, 489-91 (2009)("[W]e conclude that a non-moving defendant has
the burden of supporting a claimed af1irmative defense on a motion for summary judgment.").
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Notably, the District Court in the instant case fully accepted the Van Engelens' version of
the facts regarding the alleged misrepresentations and attendant circumstances. (Ir. p. 45, L. 14 20; p. 51 L. 18 - 24; p. 52, L. 6 - 17.) Ihe District Court then applied Idaho law to the facts viewed
in light most favorable to them and rendered its ruling of summary judgment in favor of Washington
Federal. (Ir. p. 77, L. 19 - 24.)
As to evidentiary issues, Idaho has long held that trial judges have "broad discretion as to the
admission of evidence and the exercise of that discretion will not be overturned absent the clear
showing of abuse." Cosgrove By and Through Winfree v. lt1errell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 117
Idaho 470, 473, 788 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1989). citing Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104
Idaho 897, 900, 665 P.2d 661,664 (1983). Irialjudges also are give broad discretion in determining
relevancy. Id citations omitted

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the district court erred in holding that no genuine issues of material
fact existed on the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses, and therefore granting
summary judgment in favor of the Bank.

2.

Whether Washington Federal is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
(i) Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, (ii) the subject Guaranty; and (iii) Idaho
Code § 12-120(3).
ARGUMENT

Although the issues presented on appeal are framed in the Appellants' brief in the broadest
possible terms, their arguments are much narrower, focusing primarily on two questions:

•

Did Washington Federal have a duty to disclose the existence ofthe 2002 continuing
Guaranty when extending the 2006-2007 Loans to VED?
6

•

A.

Was the alleged oral modijication ofthe 2002 continuing Guaranty barred by (i) the
Statute of Frauds, (U) lack of consideration, and/or (iii) lack of relevant evidence?

The District Court Did Not Err When it Found that Washington Federal had no Duty
to Disclose the Subject Continuing Guaranty
In support of their affirmati ve defenses, the Van Engelens repeatedly assert that Washington

Federal had a duty to disclose the existence of the subject Guaranty.

CR. Vol. I, p. 00068-00078; R.

Vol. I,p. 00112 at~~ 6,10 -13; R. Vol. III,p. 00404-00414; R. Vol. III,p. 00472; Appellants' Brief,
p. 24 -32, 40; Tr. p. 41 L. 13-19.) This common theme was recognized by the District Court:
[T]he essential argument that's pervasive throughout all of the affirmative defenses
is that somehow the bank should have disclosed the existence of the 2002 guaranty
agreement even though there's an express waiver of their requirement to disclose.
(Ir. p. 64, L. 1-5.)
As I indicted earlier, the pervasive theme thought [sic] all of these affirmative
defenses seems to stem from this idea that the Van that the bank had some
obligation to remind them that they had signed this continuing guaranty in 2002.
(Tr. p. 66, L. 25 - p. 67, L. 4.)
The District Court's finding that Washington Federal had no duty to disclose the 2002
continuing Guaranty was proper as their was neither a contractual nor legal duty to disclose.

1.

No contractual duty existed for Washington Federal to disclose the Guaranty.

Washington Federal is under no contractual duty to disclose the existence of the Guaranty.
(R. Vol. 1, p. 00056-00057.) In fact, as set forth above, the Guaranty specifically removes any duty
to notifY the Van Engelens when Washington Federal lends money or extends other credit to VED.
Paragraph 7 of the Guaranty entitled "Guarantor's Additional Waivers of Notice" reads:
Lender does not have to notify Guarantor of any of the following events and this will
not affect Guarantor's Promise.
(a) Lender does not have to notifY Guarantor of Lender's acceptance of Guarantor's
7

Promise.
(b) Lender does not have to notify Guarantor when lender lends money or extends
other credit to Borrower or acquires Obligations of Borrower.

(R. Vol. I, p. 00056-00057.) Said differently, the Van Engelens waived any right to receive notice
from Washington Federal when it lent money or extended other credit to VED (the Borrower).
The rights of a creditor against a guarantor are determined strictly from the terms of the
guaranty agreement. If the guaranty is clear and unequivocal, there is no occasion for the court to
consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Rather, the intent of the parties must be derived
from the language of the guaranty ifit is unambiguous. Valley Bankv. Larson, 104 Idaho 772,775,
663 P.2d 653, 656 (1983); McGill v. Idaho Bank & Trust, 102 Idaho 494, 498, 632 P.2d 683, 687

(1981); Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 319, 870 P.2d 663,672 (Ct.App.1994);
CIT Financial Services v. Herb' Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P.2d 890, 892
(Ct.App.1990); Johnson Equipment v. Nielson, 108 Idaho 867,871,702 P.2d 905, 909 (Ct.App.
1985). Further, when the guaranty is unconditional, the guarantor may not imply limitations upon
the creditor's right to recover. CIT Financial Services v. Herb's Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho
185,187,795 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct.App.1990).
As the District Court noted in its oral decision, the Van Engelens never asserted that the
Guaranty is ambiguous. (Tr. p. 46, L. 8-10; p. 57, L. 17-19.) The District Court found that the
Guaranty was clearly a future guaranty. (Tr. p. 46, L. 16 -47 L. 2.) The District Court also found
that the Guaranty clearly required a wTitten notice to Washington Federal by the Van Engelens to
withdraw their guaranty promise. (Tr. p. 47, L. 3-25.) Significantly, the District Court also
recognized that Washington Federal had no duty to disclose the continuing Guaranty because a
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specific provision under Guaranty states it does not have to do so. (Tr. p. 66, L. 2-7; p. 66, L. 25 p. 67, L. 9.) All the Van Engelens needed to do to withdraw their guaranty promise was to give
Washington Federal written notice of the same. (R. Vol. I, p. 00056-00057 at ~ 3; Tr. p. 47, L. 614; p. 58, L. 7-15; p. 59, L. 16-23.) Finally, the District Court properly concluded that the Van
Engelens' contention that they didn't recall signing the Guaranty as a reason for not issuing a written
withdrawal of their promise is not an excuse under the law. (Tr. p. 31, L. 25 - p. 32 L. 8; p. 33, L.
7 - 11.)
2.

No duty of disclosure arises under the Restatement of Torts.

In support of their argument that Washington Federal had a duty to disclose the existence of
the 2002 Guaranty, the Van Engelens rely upon Restatement 2d Torts §551 (see Appellants' Brief,
p. 24-25,29.), as follows:

§ 551. Liability for Nondisclosure
(1) One who falls to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably
induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subj ect to the
same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the
matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to
exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.

(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,

(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a
fiduciary or other similar relation oftmst and confidence between them; and

(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial
or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and
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(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to
be so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would
he acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in
reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the
relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective
circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.
(Emphasis added). The Van Engelens' reliance upon the Restatement is misplaced because (a) no
fiduciary duty existed between them and Washington Federal, and (b) any alleged misrepresentations
were made in context of the 2005 Loans to NWD, not the 2006-2007 Loans at issue herein.

a.

No fiduciary duty existed between Washington Federal and the Van Engelens.

In Idaho, a general debtor-creditor relationship does not create a fiduciary relationship. Idaho
First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Food, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 (1991). This Court in Black
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991)
has previously held the following:
We have been unable to locate any case in which a fiduciary relationship was held
to arise solely through a longstanding creditor-debtor relationship or prior dealings
between the customer and the bank." ... The rule expressed in the above cases holds
that the relationship in a lender-borrower situation is a debtor-creditor relationship,
and not a fiduciary relationship.
119 Idaho at 176, 804 P.2d at 905 (citing Dugan v. First National Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 201,
606 P.2d 1009, 1015 (1980). A fiduciary relationship may arise between a lender and a borrow in
limited circumstance where (i) an agreement between the parties creates a duty; or (ii) when the
10

lender exercises complete control over the disbursement of funds. See "Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho
802,804-05,10 P.3d 751,753-74 (Ct.App.2000) citing Wooden v. First Security Banko/Idaho,

NA., 121 Idaho 98,100,822 P.2d 995,997 (1991).
In this instance there is (i) no agreement or contract creating a fiduciary duty between the
parties, (ii) nor did Washington Federal exercise complete control over disbursement of the 20062007 Loans. Rather, the funds were disbursed to the Van Engelens on each of the six separate loans
who then exercised complete control over the funds. (R. Vol. I, p. 00046 at, 4.) As such, no
fiduciary duty under Idaho law was imposed upon Washington Federal to disclose the existence of
the 2002 continuing Guaranty.

b.

The alleged misrepresentations were made in the context of the 2005 Loans to
NWD, not the 2006-2007 Loans to VED.

As noted above, the District COUli assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that the
Van Engelens' allegations regarding the misrepresentations in 2005 by Washington Federal
employees were true. (Tr. p. 45, L. 14 - 20; p. 51 L. 18 - 24; p. 52, L. 6 - 17.) Throughout his
various affidavits, Craig Van Engelen consistently acknowledged that the alleged misrepresentations
were made during the course of negotiation and closing of the 2005 Loans to NWD. CR. Vol. I, p.
00097

at'~

10 - 15; R. Vol. III, p. 00452 - 00453 at" 8, 12.) Although he mistakenly identified

VED as the borrowing entity for the 2005 Loans in his initial affidavit, he subsequently corrected
that error and acknowledged that NWD was the borrower. (R. Vol. III, p. 00464 at, 8.)
The Van Engelens offered no evidence below to suggest that during negotiation and closing
of the 2005 Loans to NWD, the parties discussed, or even contemplated, the 2006-2007 Loans to
VED. Nor did they offer evidence that Washington Federal employees made any representations
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whatsoever concerning the Van Engelens' personal guaranty of the 2006-2007 Loans to VED, only
that Washington Federal failed to disclose the existence of the 2002 guaranty.
In substance, the alleged misrepresentations were "you [Van Engelens] don't have to
personally guaranty the loans to NWD." As discussed at more length in Section B.1 below, the
District Court recognized the separate legal status ofNWD and VED, and found that the allegations
of misrepresentation, even if proven true, "are irrelevant to the current cause of action based on loans
that were ultimately made at least a year later to the Van Engelens' corporate entity, Van Engelen
Development, Inc." (Tr. p. 53, L. 16 - p. 54, L. 1.) The district court's finding is consistent with
a reasoned interpretation and application of the various duties described in sections 2(b) - (e) of
Restatement §551. To conclude otherwise, the Court must (i) ignore the specific waiver contained
in the guaranty, and (ii) find that statements concerning the guarantyofloans to one legal entity may,
by reason of nothing more than common stock ownership, be relied upon in subsequent transactions
involving loans to a distinct legal entity. Such a conclusion would permit the very party [Van
Engelens} who bears primary responsibility to maintain the individual integrity of each entity, the
discretion to assert or ignore the corporate veil to their personal benefit. Clearly such a result is
absurd.
B.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Found that (1) the Van Engelens' Alleged Oral
Modification of the Guaranty violated Idaho's Statute of Frauds, I.C § 9-505(2); (2)
that Any Alleged Modification Failed for Lack of Consideration; and (3) the Alleged
Misrepresentations Relating to the 2005 Loans to NWD were Irrelevant.

1.

Statute of Frauds - I.C § 9-505(2)

In its decision, the District Court also held that any oral modifications of the continuing
personal Guaranty, either by the Van Engelens or Washington Federal, would run afoul Idaho's
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Statute of Frauds, I.e. § 9-505(2). Idaho Code § 9-505 reads in part as follows:
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents:
(2) A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code.

Contrary to the Van Engelens' contention otherwise, USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat.
Bank, 120 Idaho 271, 815 P.2d 469 (Ct.App. 1991) is directly on point in relation to oral
modifications of guarantees. In USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'Z Bank, 120 Idaho 271,276,
815 P .2d 469, 474 (Ct.App.1991), the Court held that oral modifications of a guarantee are barred
under the foregoing provisions of the statute of frauds. In that case, the Defendant-Bank issued an
irrevocable letter of credit guarantee in the amount of $15,000.00 in favor of Plaintiff-fertilizer
company for a term of 30 days. Id. at 272. The bank argued that it issued the letter of credit
guaranty solely for the purpose of ensuring that the plaintiffwould not be "left hanging" pending the
approval and processing of an operating loan, for the bank's customer Sterling Smith, and that once
the operating loan was approved, the plaintiff could no longer look to the letter of credit, only to the
funds available for payment from the approved operating loan. Id. at 274-75.
The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that an additional "interpretation" of the 30 day letter of credit
guaranty was provided by a bank representative, which further clarified the parties' original
understanding of the letter of credit. Id. at 275. The plaintiff alleged that during this phone call, the
bank representative's "interpretation" allowed the plaintiff to demand payment any time Mr. Smith's
account was thirty days late, and thus morphed into a continuing guarantee extending to all unpaid
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billings incurred through the 1987 crop season, (as opposed to just the initial application of fertilizer
to Mr. Smith's fields). [d at 273-275.
In a footnote, the Court in USA Fertilizer made an important distinction that "evidence of the
parties" subsequent conduct may be admissible to explain or clarifY the meaning intended by the
parties to a contract. However, this principle is pertinent to issues involving the applicability of the
parol evidence exclusionary rule; it does not apply to avoid the operation of the statute of frauds."
[d.

at 275. (emphasis added). The Court further held that to the extent plaintiff sought to argue that

this "evidence as altering the original terms of the guarantee, we note that such an oral modification
would be barred under the statute of frauds." Id at 275. (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the Van Engelens seek to nullifY the continuing Guaranty based upon (i)
allegations that Washington Federal orally agreed they would not be required to guaranty the 2005
Loans to NWD, and (2) Washington Federal's failure to disclose the existence of the guaranties
during closing of the 2006-2007 Loans to VED. In each instance, the Van Engelens are asking this
Court to allow oral modification of the Guaranty. The former argument necessarily relies upon an
alleged oral modification of the explicit provision of the Guaranty which requires written notice of
any withdrawal thereof by the Van Engelens. The latter argument similarly relies upon oral
statements to modifY the provisions of the Guaranty wherein the Van Engelens specifically waived
notice of (a) Washington Federal's acceptance of the Van Engelens' promise to pay, and (b) any
loans extended to VED. Based upon Idaho Code §9-505, as interpreted in USA Fertilizer, the Van
Engelens' arguments are fatally flawed as a matter oflaw. Therefore the District Court's ruling that
the Statute of Frauds barred any alleged oral modification of the Guaranty - i.e, the requirement that
their guaranty promise could be withdrawn only upon receipt of written notice - should be affirmed
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on appeal.

2.

Lack of Consideration.

Despite the Van Engelens' contention otherwise, their attempt to withdraw their guaranty
promise orally is a modification of the continuing Guaranty. Paragraph 3 of the Guaranty entitled
"Written Notice Needed to Withdraw Guarantor's Promise" clearly states that the Van Engelens'
continuing guaranty "shall remain effective until Lender actually receives written notice from
Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise." (R. Vol. I, p. 00056-00057 at, 3.) Any
deviation or change from this clearly worded contractual requirement constitutes a modification.
Consideration is required for a modification of a contract. BrandS. COlp. v. King, 102 Idaho
731,733,639 P.2d429, 431 (1981). "[T]he general rule is well stated to the effectthatwherea party
merely does that which in law he is bound to do, he cannot demand any additional pay therefor, and
if he obtains an additional promise from the other party, it is nudum pactum and unenforceable."
Id. citing Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Peterson, 102 Idaho 111,626 P.2d 767 (1981).

In King the parties entered into a written logging contract which included a loan from the
plaintiff to the defendant in the sum of$140,000.00. King 102 Idaho at 732. After the contract was
signed, the lumber market collapsed. Id. The defendant/debtor alleged that a conversation had taken
place with the plaintiff s representative, wherein the representative told the defendant, inter alia, that
the defendants should try to save themselves from bankruptcy and to forget about the $140,000.00
debt. Id. The plaintiff denied discussing forgiveness of the debt. Id. The King Court held, that even
if the alleged oral conversation took place, the alleged oral modification was unenforceable and of
no effect because the record was silent as to any evidence of valid consideration passing between the
parties. Id. at 733.
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Similarly herein, there is no evidence whatsoever that any valid consideration passed from
the Van Engelens to Washington Federal in exchange for oral modification of the Guaranty. (Tr. p.
59, L. 24 - p. 60, L. 24.) In the absence of valid consideration for the alleged oral modification of
the Guaranty, the District Court's entry of summary judgment should be affirmed.

3.

Lack of Relevant Evidence.

The Van Engelens have repeatedly alleged misrepresentation and/or concealment by
Washington Federal employees at the time of making the 2005 Loans to NWD. Mr. Van Engelen's
Supplemental Affidavit serves only to reaffirm this position. (R. Vol. III, p. 00451-00454.) Therein,
Mr. Van Engelen attempts to establish a connection between the 2005 Loans to NWD and the 20062007 Loans to VED. In a curious twist by a debtor, Mr. Van Engelen would have the Court believe
that VED is the alter ego ofNWD because the 2005 Loans and the "later loans were substantially
for the same project." Jd. The District Court described this effort as "nuance". (Tr. p. 14, L. 24 p. 15, L. 3; p. 70, L. 8-l3.) Recognizing the clear legal distinction between NWD and VED, the
Court rejected this proposition, finding that such fact is material to the Van Engelens' liability under
their Guaranty of the 2006-2007 Loans to VED. (Tr. p. 30, L. 23 - p. 31, L. 7; p. 38, L. 19 - p. 39,
L. 15;p. 53, L. 1 -11.)
Finding that the Van Engelens' "subjective beliefs are not reasonable", the District Court held
that "any allegations about actions during the [2005] Northwest Development loan negotiations are
irrelevant to the current cause of action based on loans that were ultimately made at least a year later
to the Van Engelens' corporate entity, Van Engelen Development, Inc." (Tr. p. 53, L. 1 - p. 54, L.

1.)
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C.

The Van Engelens Failed to Meet their Burden of Proof as to All Elements of Their
Affirmative Defenses.
The District Court, in support of its entry of summary judgment in favor of Washington

Federal, addressed each of the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses, making specific findings as to
why each separate defense failed to prove all necessary elements to survive summary judgment
respectively. See Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,769-71,215 P.3d 485,489-91 (2009)("[W]e
conclude that a non-moving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense
on a motion for summary judgment."). As the Van Engelens are not appealing the affirmative
defenses of (i) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (ii) set off; (iii) unfair and
deceptive trade practices, and (iv) unclean hands, Washington Federal will not address the same
here. (Appellants' Brief, p. 10, fn. 4.)

1.

Waiver

A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. Frontier Fed. Say. &

Loan Ass'n v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808,812,853 P.2d 553,557 (1993). A party asserting that
provisions of a written contract were subsequently waived or modified by oral agreement or by
conduct of the parties has the burden of proving assertion by clear and convincing evidence. Bouten

Canst. Co. v. /vi & L Land Co., 125 Idaho 957, 965, 877 P.2d 928, 936 (Ct.App. 1994). Waiver of
a contract provision is shown when the intention to waive is clearly present and the party asserting
the waiver shows that he acted in reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his
position to his detriment. A1agic Valley Foods, Inc. v. Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. 134 Idaho 785, 788,
10 P.3d 734, 737 (2000).

Waiver will not be inferred except from clear and unequivocal act

manifesting intent to waive. Jones v. A1aestas 108 Idaho 69, 71, 696 P.2d 920,922 (Ct.App. 1985).
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The Van Engelens have produced no admissible evidence to rebut Mr. Churchill's affidavit,
that Washington Federal did not voluntarily or intentionally waive its right to enforce the subject
continuing Guaranty, or to show that they altered their position to their detriment. (R. Vol. p. 00049
at, 14.) As admitted by the Van Engelens themselves, all allegations regarding discussions with
Washington Federal regarding the Van Engelens' guaranty promise run to the 2005 Loans with
NWD, not to the 2006-2007 Loans to VED - a separate and distinct legal entity. As noted by the
District Court, there is nothing in the record below to support, as the Van Engelens suggest, that it
made no difference to Washington Federal which entity borrowed the 2006-2007 Loans. (Tr. p. 38,
L. 22 - p. 39, L. 12.) Therefore, the District Court's finding that Washington Federal did not waive

the Van Engelens' guaranty promise applicable of the 2006-2007 Loans to VED is supported both
in fact and in law and should be affirmed accordingly.
2.

Equitable Estoppel

The elements of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment of a material
fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was made with
the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to whom the representation was made, or
from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to his
or her prejudice. Regjovich v. First Western Investments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 158,997 P.2d 615,
619 (2000). All factors of equitable estoppel are of equal importance, and there can be no estoppel
absent any of the elements. Id Finally, Idaho courts have long held that one may not claim estoppel
based upon another's misrepresentations if the one claiming estoppel has readily accessible means
to discover the truth. Id
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The Van Engelens' equitable estoppel defense claims fails for several reasons. First, as
discussed at length above, the alleged misrepresentations/concealment regarding their personal
guaranty of loans to a separate and distinct legal entity has no relevance to the loans at issue in case
at bar. Second, as the District Court found, the Van Engelens indeed had the ability to discover the
truth about the 2002 continuing Guaranty, as they have admitted signing the document. The fact that
they didn't recall signing the Guaranty, failed to read it before signing it, or misplaced it, does not
provide an excuse in the law. If this were the case, any party could avoid their contractual
obligations by claiming the same.
Finally, the Van Engelens have produced no admissible evidence that they relied upon the
alleged misrepresentations. l Said differently, there is no admissible evidence in the record that the
VED could have obtained financing for the real estate project from another lending institution
without the requirement of personal guaranty. The Van Engelens have alleged, that before entering
into the 2005 Loans with Washington Federal, they solicited loan proposals from other lending
institutions, that the other banks submitted "stronger proposals", which did not require the Van
Engelens to personally guaranty the loans. (R. Vol. II, p. 000371 at p. 25 L. 25 - p. 28 L. 21; R. Vol.
1, p. 00087 at ~ 9; R. Vol. I, p. 00097 at

~

9.) In substance, the Van Engelens assert that "but for"

their reliance upon Washington Federal's misrepresentations, they could have secured loans with a
competing bank without the necessity of a personal guaranty. In order to establish this element of
their defense, the Van Engelens must necessarily introduce evidence of the terms offered by the

The District Court granted Washington Federal's Motion to Strike testimony contained
in paragraph 6 of the Mr. Van Engelen's Supplemental Affidavit that reads " ... other banks had
submitted proposals not requiring personal guarantees" as inadmissible hearsay, conclusory, and
irrelevant. (Tr. p. 10, L. 10- 19; R. Vol. III, p. 00455 - 00457; R. Vol III, p. 00452 at ~ 6.)
I
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competing banks.
In Mr. Van Engelens' deposition, he testified that the competing bank proposals were
provided in writing, and that the proposals were probably in the landfill. (R. Vol. II. p. 0003 71 at
p. 27, L. 7 - 16.) This "reliance" evidence argued by the Van Engelens consists entirely of testimony
concerning the contents of writings that were never offered into evidence. Thus, in addition to the
other reasons outlined above, the Van Engelens' affirmative defense of equitable estoppel fails as
they cannot show a reliance to their detriment.

3.

Quasi Estoppel

The Van Engelens' quasi-estoppel argument is equally lacking in merit. Quasi estoppel is
only established when (1) the offending party took a different position than his or her original
position; and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the
other party; (b) the other party was induced to change position; or (c) it would be unconscionable to
permit the otTending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already
derived a benefit or acquiesced in. Allen v. Reyno ld<; , 145 Idaho 807, 812,186, P.3d 663,668
(2008).
Again, Washington Federal did not change its position concerning the necessity of a personal
guaranty. As demonstrated above, the six VED loans at issue in this lawsuit are distinct transactions
trom the 2005 Loans upon which the Van Engelens rely. The subject Guaranty imposes personal
liability upon the Van Engelens for obligations taken out and defaulted upon by VED, not NWD.
Moreover, no advantage to Washington Federal, nor a disadvantage to the Van Engelens occurred
other than what was contracted for under the Guaranty. The Van Engelens were not induced to
change positions, because as argued above, there is no admissible evidence to prove that VED
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would, or could, have obtained loans from other banks without the requirement of a personal
guaranty. Finally, because Washington Federal did not take an inconsistent position as to the Van
Engelens' guaranty of the 2006-2007 Loans, and because it did not receive a benefit due to VED's
non-payment of the same, there is no unconscionable conduct on behalf of Washington Federal to
support the Van Engelens' defense of quasi estoppel. Therefore, the District Court's entry of
summary judgment on this affirmative defense should be affirmed.
4.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing

It is a standard principal of Idaho contract law that every party to a contract has a duty of

good faith and fair dealing that includes the obligation not to impede or render impossible the
required performance of the other party under that contract. Kepler v. WHW itfanagement Inc., 121
Idaho 466,472,825 P.2d 1122, 1128 (CLApp. 1992). However, a breach of the covenant does not
occur when a party merely exercises its rights under the contract. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841,863 (1991). Moreover, there can be no breach

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing when that alleged breach is based upon an
allegation that would violate an express enforceable term of the underlying contract. Independence
Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla }vfining Co., 143 Idaho 22,26, 137 P.3d 409,413 (2006). This Court has

rejected "the amorphous concept of bad faith as the standard for determining whether the covenant
has been breached. Id. citing }vietcaljv. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744,
749 (1989). Rather, "the covenant is an objective determination of whether the parties have acted
in good faith in terms of enforcing the contractual provisions." Id. citing Jenkins v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 243, 108 P.3d 380, 390 (2005). Thus, an objective determination can only

be made by considering a party's reasonableness in carrying out the contract provisions. Id.
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The contract at issue herein is the Van Engelens' continuing personal Guaranty. The
Guaranty unambiguously imposes an express obligation upon the Van Engelens to guaranty "any
present or future Obligations Borrower owes to Lender and shall remain effective until Lender
actually receives written notice from Guarantor that Guarantor withdraws Guarantor's Promise."
(R. Vol. I, p. 00056 - 00057 at ~ 3.) There is no dispute that the Van Engelens signed the Guaranty

and that they did not give written notice withdrawing their promise. It is improper to entertain the
Van Engelens' subjective beliefs in relation to whether or not Washington Federal knew or should
have known that the Van Engelens were aware or unaware of the existence of the Guaranty.
Because Washington Federal was merely exercising its rights under the Guaranty, there can be no
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the District Court's
ruling below should be affirmed.
5.

FraudlMisrepresentation/Discharge

In order to sustain a claim for misrepresentation or fraud, the Van Engelens must prove each
of the following elements:(l) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) intent that it should be acted on by the person
and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) reliance on
the truth; (8) a right to rely thereon; and (9) consequent and proximate injury. Witt v. Jones, 111
Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474,477 (1986). "An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for
statements of future events." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 615,114 P.3d 974,
985 (2005) citing Thomas v. •A.1edical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200,207,61 P.3d 557, 564
(2002). "[T]here is a general rule in [the] law of deceit that a representation consisting of [a]
promise or a statement as to a future event will not serve as [a] basis for fraud ... " Id. citing Sharp
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v. Idaho Inv. Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122,504 P.2d 386,396 (1972).
The Van Engelens' claim of fraud is without merit. As the Van Engelens readily admit, the
allegations of fraudulent statements took place in reference to the 2005 Loans to NWD. The Van
Engelens go to great lengths to persuade this Court that this case is about what occurred in relation
to the 2005 Loans with NWD. However, this case involves the Guaranty signed by the Van
Engelens for loans made to VED. The 2005 Loans to NWD involved a separately executed guaranty
all together. The attempt by the Van Engelens to bootstrap allegations of fraud for the 2005 Loans
to the 2006-2007 Loans is not supported under Idaho law, as actions for fraud are not tenable for
statements of future events.
There is no evidence in the record below to suggest that at the time of the 2005 Loans, the
parties contemplated or discussed the 2006-2007 Loans. Certainly Washington Federal was under
no legal obligation to extend the 2006-2007 Loans back in2005. Thus, the Van Engelens' argument
for alleged fraud in relation to the Guaranty for VED and/or that Washington Federal made a
promise without the intention of keeping is misplaced.

In addition, the Van Engelens' defense of fraud fails because as discussed above, they had
no reliance or right to rely upon the alleged misrepresentations because they could have easily
ascertained the truth regarding the Guaranty that they signed. The Van Engelens could have then
simply provided Washington Federal with written notice to withdraw their guaranty promises.
Further, as discussed above, the Van Engelens have no right to rely upon the alleged
misrepresentations, as they contractually waived any need for Washington Federal to disclose the
existence of the Guaranty. Finally, the Van Engelens have provided no evidence of damage or injury
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required for finding of fraud.

The District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of

Washington Federal was sound and should be affirmed.

6.

Intent of Whether Guarantee Was to Apply

The District Court did not err when it held that the continuing Guaranty applied to the 20062007 Loans as the unambiguous language in the Guaranty clearly applied to all future obligations
to VED unless revoked in writing. The Van Engelens argue that because the 2006-2007 Loan
documents don't reference the continuing Guaranty, their was no intent for the continuing Guaranty
to apply. This position is contrary to the clear language contained in the Guaranty itself. As argued
above, the fact that the Van Engelens didn't remember signing the Guaranty is no excuse under the
law. Additionally, Washington Federal was under no duty to disclose or remind the Van Engelens
about the Guaranty on the 2006-2007 Loans as outlined above. There is no dispute of fact that the
Van Engelens were obligated under the continuing Guaranty to pay for the obligations of VED in
relation to the 2006-2007 Loans. Accordingly, the District Court's decision should be upheld.

7.

Fraudulent Inducement

For the reasons argued above in relation to fraud and misrepresentation, the Van Engelens'
affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement equally fails.

8.

No Damages, Unjust Enrichment, Failure to Mitigate, and Double Recovery

The Van Engelens argue that in the event the Guaranty is found to be enforceable against
them, there exists genuine issues of material fact on whether Washington Federal actually suffered
any damages or that it failed to mitigate its damages. The Van Engelens reason that because
Washington Federal owns the real property collateral by virtue of trustees' sales, it has an obligation
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to mitigate its damages through future sales of the property.
While Washington Federal does not contest that there exists a general duty to mitigate
damages, such duty must only be reasonable. 0 Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257,262, 796 P.2d 134,
139 (CLApp. 1990). Here, Washington Federal acted reasonably by properly foreclosing upon the
collateral via notice and sale pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. Once a sale is made pursuant
to Idaho Code § 45-1501, et seq. all interest in the property is foreclosed and terminated as to all
persons having an interest therein, (and entitled to notice under the act), and there is no right of
redemption. See, Idaho Code § 45-1508. The Van Engelens, as guarantors, have no right to look
to the real property collateral in an effort to lessen their damages. Because the Van Engelens
unconditionally guaranteed the obligations of Van Engelen Development, any implied obligation
which limits Washington Federal's right of recovery, (i.e. an implied obligation to develop or sell
the property at a later date), is improper.
Following the Van Engelens' logic, if Washington Federal chose to hold onto the real
property collateral for twenty years or more before deciding to sell off parcels (or in whole), the
Court would be required to retain jurisdiction over this matter indefinitely to make a determination
of damages. As titled owners of the collateral, Washington Federal can elect to either sit on the
property or begin selling it immediately without reduction of the amount of damages owed under
contract (not statute) by the Van Engelens, who never had an interest in the property to being with.
Here, as recognized by the District Court, Washington Federal acted within the express terms
of the Guaranty by foreclosing upon the real property collateral. Under the Guaranty, the Van
Engelens expressly waived any right to require Washington Federal to proceed against the real
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property collateral or attempt to collect from the Borrower, VED. (R. Vol. p. 56 - 57 at ~ ~ 5, 6.)
Thus, as the District Court properly found in relying upon Idaho law and the subject continuing
Guaranty, Washington Federal could "chose to seek remedy from the Van Engelens, a foreclosure
on the property or both." (Tr. p. L. 2 - 25.)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Van Engelens' failure to mitigate damages argument fails
too because, as outlined at length above, the alleged misrepresentations and concealment by
Washington Federal apply to different loan transactions than the damages which Washington Federal
seeks under this lawsuit.
D.

Washington Federal's Attorney Fees on Appeal.
In the event Washington Federal is successful in defending the Van Engelens' appeal in this

matter, Washington Federal, as the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys fees and costs pursuant
to Rules 40 and 41 ofIdaho Appellate Rules arising from Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the subject
continuing Guaranty itself.
Idaho follows the "American Rule" with respect to an award of attorneys fees, which
requires the respective parties to bear their own attorneys fees absent either (i) statutory
authorization; or (ii) contractual right. Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.,
132 Idaho 754,771,979 P.2d 627, 644 (1999); Jenkins v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 19 Idaho 290, 297,
113 P. 463, _

(1911 )("1t is the general rule that attorney's fees cannot be recovered in an action

unless authorized by statute or by express agreement of the parties.").
1.

Statutory Basis for Attorney's Fees - Recovery upon a Guaranty.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides for attorney's fees claims "[iJn any civil action to recover
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on open account. .. guarantv .. .and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law .... " (emphasis added). Here, if Washington Federal is the prevailing party on appeal, it would
be entitled to attorney's fees authorized by § 12-120(3) on two separate grounds: (1) recovery upon
the Guaranty; and (2) recovery upon the commercial transaction involved in this case. A review of
Washington Federal's Complaint shows that it is sought recovery upon the Van Engelens' guaranty
ofVED's obligations. (R. Vol. 1. p. 00008 - 00012 at ~ 6.) Accordingly, under Idaho Code § 12120(3), Washington Federal is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal if the prevailing party.

2.

Statutory Basis for Attorney's Fees - Recovery upon a Commercial Transaction.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) authorizes attorney's fees to be awarded to Washington Federal as
it sought recovery upon commercial transactions with the Van Engelens. Idaho uses a two-stage
analysis for determining attorney fees for a prevailing party pursuant to a commercial transaction
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Great Plains Equip., Inc., 136 Idaho at 471. First, "there must be
a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim"; and second "the commercial transaction must
be the basis upon which recovery is sought." Id.
In this instance, Washington Federal is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-120(3) because Washington Federal extended six (6) separate real estate development and
construction loans, which were not for personal or household purposes. See I.C. § 12-120(3) ("The
term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal
or household purposes."). Moreover, the commercial transaction oflending money was integral to
Washington Federal's claims against the Van Engelens and was the basis upon which recovery was
sought. Therefore, Washington Federal is also entitled to attorney's fees arising from the underlying
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commercial transactions in this lawsuit as authorized under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
3.

Contractual Basis for Attorney's Fees.

In addition to attorney's fees authorized by statute, Washington Federal, as prevailing party
on appeal, is entitled to its attorney's fees under contract agreement. Attorney's fees are allowable
if provided for in a contract. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 434,111 P.3d 110, 119 (2005).
Contractual attorney fee provisions "represent an election by the parties to place the risk oflitigation
costs on the one who is ultimately unsuccessful. Such provisions are ordinarily to be honored by the
courts." Holmes v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787 874 P.2d 595, 598 (Ct.App. 1994).
Here, the subject Guaranty provides specific language regarding allocation of risk for
attorney's fees and costs to the Van Engelens as follows: "Guarantor agrees to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee and all other costs and expenses which Lender may incur in enforcing or defending
this agreement, whether or not a lawsuit is started." (R. Vol. 1. p. 00056 - 00057 at ,-r 12.)
Accordingly, Washington Federal is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the express language
of the subject Guaranty.
CONCLUSION
No issues of material fact exists to either Washington Federal's motion for summary
judgement or as to the Van Engelens' affirmative defenses.

As such, Washington Federal

respectfully requests that the District Court's order of summary judgment be affirmed in whole.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of September, 2011.

Attorney for Respondent, Washington Federal
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